Nowadays, failures in high performance computers (HPC) became the norm rather than the exception [10] . In the near future, the mean time between failures (MTBF) of HPC systems is expected to be too short, and that current failure recovery mechanisms e.g., checkpoint-restart, will no longer be able to recover the systems from failures [1] . Early failure detection is a new class of failure recovery methods that can be beneficial for HPC systems with short MTBF. Detecting failures in their early stage can reduce their negative effects by preventing their propagation to other parts of the system [3] . Linux, with a share of 97%, is the dominant operating system among world top 500 supercomputers [11] . All Linuxbased systems, support Syslog [4] as a basic service. By default vital parts of the system send their activity log into Syslog service. Therefore, Syslog entries (hereafter, syslogs) are invaluable sources of information to monitor and analyze system behavior. Because of Linux popularity, any approach based on syslogs can be easily extended to be used on other HPC systems. Also, syslog analysis is a passive approach and, therefore, it has no influence on the system performance. In [6] we proposed an approach to predict failures. Later, in [5] we revealed the temporal and spatial correlation of failures. And in [7] we introduced a prototype to analyze system behavior. This body of research became possible solely because of the existence of the HPC system (Taurus 1 ) syslogs. Syslogs contain very detailed information about all fundamental services and daemons. On one hand, this detailed information helps understanding the system behavior better. On the other hand, too much data makes it harder to extract the required information. Apart from these pros and cons, syslogs also contain sensitive data which might be used to uniquely identify system users and to track their activities. Even though there were some projects in the past [9, 8] 
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We already saved a lot of space and processing time, via deidentifying and constantifying syslogs (hereafter, DC-syslogs).
Hashing, brings us to the next level. Using the hashed entries, rather that the raw text, significantly increases the efficiency of pattern matching algorithms [2] . Hashing the DC-syslog sample, gives us the below output:
The complete set of hash codes on our HPC machine has less than 1000 elements. Therefore using a 3 digit hash code is sufficient, and we can save even more space. The final pre-processed syslog sample looks like this: Note that the first and third line were given the same 3-digit hash code. For some pattern matching algorithms a constant hash code length is more beneficial. We ran the very same approach on Taurus. On average we enjoyed from more than 90% disk space reduction. Using the proposed approach, even though we have to perform a pre-processing of syslogs, the overall performance is at least 3 times higher than processing the plain unaltered syslogs.
The big picture and conclusion Analyzing syslogs, gives us a deep insight about system behavior. Our preliminary results indicate that there are patterns in syslogs. Using these patterns we can detect failures in their early stage, and ideally predict them. Beside normal information, syslogs contain sensitive data which can potentially enable syslog analyzers to endanger users privacy. Because of these privacy concerns, there are very few publicly accessible collection of syslogs. On the other hand, too many details in syslogs, makes their storage expensive, increases the analysis complexity, and hides the useful information. De-identifying, constantifying, and hashing syslogs (hereafter, DCH-syslogs), address both challenges. The DCH-syslogs, have no sensitive data, need less disk space, take less time to analyze, and give a clear view over the system behavior without hiding the important information.
Since DCH-syslogs, do not contain any sensitive data and take less disk space, they can freely and easily be released to the public domain. By using DCH-syslogs, we are intentionally ignoring some details in the data. These details do not have interesting information for our failure prediction approach. The benefits gained, e.g. diverse syslogs from different HPC machines to test and prove the efficiency of prediction mechanisms, faster analysis, reproducible researches, contributing to open science, and so on, outweight the costs.
